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PREAMBLE 
 
This report contains a summary of the British findings from an international 
research programme which has examined the implementation of European 
environmental policy at the local level.  The Programme, entitled 'Conditions 
for the Integration of European Community Environmental Policy at the Local 
Level: A Social, Cultural and Political Analysis', was funded by the European 
Commission's Directorate-General (DG) XII (responsible for Science, Research 
and Development) under its SEER (Socio-Economic Environmental Research) 
Programme.  The research was carried out during 1993 and 1994 by national 
teams in five Member States of the European Union (France, Germany, Greece, 
Spain and the UK).  The aim of the research was to elicit the ways in which 
European environmental directives are implemented at the local level, and how 
implementation effects changes in local, regional and national administrative 
and regulatory organisations and procedures. 
 
Similar studies were pursued in each of the five Member States.  These 
involved analysis of the published policy statements from national and local 
governments, reviews of administrative structures and procedures, interviews 
with key actors responsible for policy implementation at the national, regional 
and local levels, and interviews with the relevant local and national economic 
and environmental interests.  Three case study directives relating to water 
quality were selected for detailed study.  These were the Bathing Waters 
Directive (76/160), the Shellfish Waters Directive (79/778) and the Drinking 
Water Directive (80/778).   
 
The research has been conducted by teams of social scientists based at the 
Centre for Rural Economy in the Department of Agricultural Economics and 
Food Marketing at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK; the Centre 
National de la Recherche Scientifique, Université de Paris X, France; the 
Department of Geography, Université de Paris VII, France; the Science Centre 
(WZB), Berlin, Germany; the Department of Political Science and Public 
Administration, University of Athens, Greece; and the Department of Ecology 
in the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology, University of Madrid, Spain. 
 
This report contains only the summary findings from the British part of the 
study.  (A more detailed report on the British research is published as Volume II 
of this Research Report and a comparative report on the five European Member 
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States will be published in the summer of 1995).  The study area for the local 
research in Britain was Devon in the south west of England.  The British 
research team would like to thank all those people who gave their time and co-
operation to be interviewed during the course of the research.  These include 
staff in the London, Bristol and Exeter offices of the National Rivers Authority, 
officials in the Department of the Environment and the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food, officers and councillors of Devon County Council and East 
Devon District Council, Devon farmers, shellfish growers and their 
representatives, and staff at South West Water Plc, Welsh Water Plc, the Water 
Services Association, the Confederation of British Industry, the Marine 
Conservation Society, the Shellfish Association of Great Britain, the Institution 
of Environmental Health Officers, Friends of the Earth and Surfers Against 
Sewage.  We are particularly grateful to those people who subsequently read 
and commented on draft chapters of this report.  We would also like to express 
our thanks to Steve Ward at the Centre for Rural Economy for his help during 
the study, and the European Commission's DG XII for funding the research. 
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SUMMARY  
 
i) Britain and European Environmental Policy 
 
The entry of Britain into the then European Community and the gradual 
emergence of a European role in environmental regulation have had profound 
effects upon British approaches to environmental management.  As Haigh and 
Baldock pointed out in the late 1980s, "A few years ago it was not accepted that 
a significant part of British environmental policy was being made at the 
[European] level.  Now that is hard to deny" (1989, p.22). 
 
Nowhere has this European role been more pronounced than in the protection of 
water quality.  A plethora of directives intended to protect different aspects of 
water quality have been agreed by Europe's Member States since the early 
1970s.  In the UK their implementation and the requirement that various water 
quality standards be met by the mid to late 1980s coincided with a major 
reorganisation of water management resulting from the privatisation of the 
water industry in England and Wales in 1989.  The 1989 Water Act created new 
regulatory bodies with fresh powers (the National Rivers Authority, Ofwat and 
the Drinking Water Inspectorate), while privatising the ownership of those 
bodies both providing drinking water and waste water services.  The reforms 
also provided an opportunity to integrate some of the objectives of European 
environmental directives more centrally within the British regulatory system.  
For example, the standards set out in the Drinking Water Directive formally 
became part of British legislation when they were laid down in the Water 
Quality Regulations passed under the 1989 Act.  It is increasingly inappropriate, 
therefore, to think in terms of EU directives 'impacting' upon a complete and 
pre-existing national regulatory system.  The objectives of several directives 
now form an integral part of the British approach to managing water quality 
(Howarth, 1994; Ward and Garrod, 1994). 
 
There seems to be little doubt that EU water quality directives have forced 
important improvements in the protection of water quality in Britain.  Nigel 
Haigh of the Institute for European Environmental Policy and a leading analyst 
and advisor on British environmental policy recently expressed Europe's impact 
in the following terms: 
 
"I have no doubt whatever that the legislation on the environment 
developed by the EC over the last 20 years has been the single 
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biggest driving force for improving environmental standards in the 
UK.  One of the characteristics of EC legislation is that it sets 
numerical standards by deadlines in a way which you don't find in 
British legislation.  The moment it's set with a deadline ... [for 
example] you've got to meet bathing water standards by a certain 
date .... Britain's self image is that it only signs up to things which 
it obeys, and so it actually has to fulfil these obligations" (BBC 
Radio 4, Talking Green Politics, 6th August 1994). 
 
The strength of European environmental policy has not been lost on the public 
at large; public opinion surveys repeatedly show that a clear majority of British 
people favour action at the European level to protect the environment rather 
than leaving decisions to the UK Government (ENDS, 1994).   
 
Prior to what we might term the 'Europeanisation' of British water pollution 
policy, British practice was characterised by flexibility, pragmatism, 
administrative discretion, accommodative and technocratic approaches and 
relatively closed policy communities which included policy makers, water 
authorities and industrial specialists (Lowe and Flynn, 1989).  The discretionary 
approach of the past not only meant an accommodating stance towards 
industrial concerns, but also that the pace of improvement in pollution control 
should be set by public expenditure priorities and plans.  For example, the 
recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s led to a dramatic slowdown in the 
implementation of the 1974 Control of Pollution Act (Levitt, 1980).  However, 
the recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s has not resulted in a similar 
slowdown because new statutory obligations resulting from European 
environmental directives allowed the Government much less discretion. 
 
In addition, in agreeing to EU directives the Government accepts commitments 
that it cannot lightly abdicate.  In a number of instances, including sewage 
contamination of bathing waters and nitrate and pesticide contamination of 
drinking water, the consequence has been to force the pace of remedial action 
and significantly enlarge its scope despite Government complacency.  Through 
the institutions of the EU, moreover, international pressures have been more 
effectively brought to bear where Britain has seemed out of line.  On some 
issues Britain has found herself isolated, and the Government has felt obliged to 
make concessions to international opinion. 
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In general terms, one might conclude that the integration of British 
environmental policy making into a European framework has challenged a two 
fold insularity: an administrative insularity which in the past has exhibited a 
certain self satisfaction over a system of environmental regulations that has 
evolved in an ad hoc, pragmatic and piecemeal manner; and a geographical 
insularity which, through exploiting the capacities of the prevailing winds, fast-
flowing rivers and turbulent surrounding seas, has pursued a 'dilute and 
disperse' approach to solve, or at least dispel, major pollution problems. 
 
The pragmatic orientation in British policy making means that considerable 
attention tends to be paid to the precise aims of legislation and its 
'implementability' before legislation is drafted.  The British prefer to have a 
clear sense of the measures, means and procedures by which the objectives of 
policy will be achieved.  The tradition has been to devise legislation which may 
leave considerable discretion to Ministers, civil servants and administrative 
bodies to determine the precise means and pace of implementation and does not 
leave them open to legal challenge.  In the past, this was to facilitate an 
accommodative, technocratic and decentralised approach to implementation.  
European legislation, in contrast, tends to be much more specific about intended 
outcomes in terms of environmental standards, but to be unspecific about the 
means of meeting them.  The discretionary scope in directives has been used, 
where possible, by central government in Britain to moderate the impact and 
control the pace of complying with European legislation.  As a result, the 
discretionary tradition within British public administration now fosters 
centralising rather than decentralising tendencies. 
 
The British Government is moving towards transposing directives by translating 
their text into national legislation, but where directives still contain subjective 
terms, such as, for example, when designations have to be made 'where the 
Member States consider' certain actions to be required,  then there is still an 
important role for the interpretation of the directive and the precise definition of 
terms in the pre-legislative stage.  As our research on the Bathing Waters and 
Shellfish Waters Directives demonstrates, this interpretative phase can be 
crucial in enabling central government to limit the impact of European 
environmental directives. 
 
Our research points to a strong degree of centralised control in the interpretation 
and implementation of EU environmental directives in the UK, particularly 
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when compared to other Member States where much greater discretionary 
powers fall to the regional and local levels of government.  In the UK, not only 
does the Department of the Environment (DoE) guide the way directives are 
interpreted, but also constrains the activities of the NRA in securing compliance 
with directive's requirements.  For example, it is the DoE that decides whether 
individual bathing waters can be added to the list of waters officially designated 
for protection under the Bathing Waters Directive.  It is also the DoE that helps 
decide how far the NRA can require water companies to go in improving 
pollution control in order to meet water quality standards.   
 
Both the importance of particular directives in reshaping British water 
management, and the crucial role of central government in mediating the impact 
of European law will be illustrated below as we briefly summarise the findings 
from our three case study directives. 
 
ii) The Three Case Study Water Quality Directives 
 
a) The Bathing Waters Directive  
 
The Bathing Waters Directive (76/160) was adopted in 1976.  It aims to 
maintain or raise the quality of bathing water over time for public health and 
amenity reasons.  The Directive lists 19 physical, chemical and microbiological 
parameters.  Against 13 of these are two values; 'I' (Imperative, or 'Mandatory') 
values and 'G' (Guideline) values.  Member States are obliged to set values 
which bathing waters must meet, and these values must be no less stringent that 
the 'I' values.  'I' values therefore represent the legally enforceable minimum 
standard.  Member States should also "endeavour to observe" the more stringent 
'G' values but these are not legally enforceable.   
 
A bathing water is defined in Article 1 of the Directive as "all running or still 
fresh waters or parts thereof and sea water, in which: bathing is explicitly 
authorised by the competent authorities of each Member State; or bathing is not 
prohibited and is traditionally practised by large numbers of bathers".  Because 
there were no statutory provisions by which public bodies either explicitly 
authorised or prohibited bathing, the Government in 1979 asked the then 
Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) and District Councils to identify those 
waters where bathing was 'traditionally practised by a large number of bathers'.  
A Government Advice Note of 9th July 1979 set out the criteria upon which 
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bathing waters were to be designated.  These were: bathing waters with fewer 
than 500 people in the water at any one time would not be designated; stretches 
of bathing waters would be designated where the number of bathers exceeded 
1500 per mile; and bathing waters with between 750 and 1500 bathers per mile 
would be open to negotiation between the RWAs and District Councils (NRA, 
1991, p.24).  This very narrow interpretation of what constitutes a 'designated 
bathing water' resulted in the designation of only 27 waters for the whole of the 
UK, excluded many well-known bathing resorts and included no inland bathing 
water sites.  This initial list, which meant that the UK had fewer designated 
bathing waters than land-locked Luxembourg, drew derision from influential 
commentators and the Government's independent advisers (Royal Commission 
on Environmental Pollution, 1984).  The European Commission issued a 
Reasoned Opinion that the Government had failed to take all the necessary steps 
to comply with the Directive (OJ, C8/21, 10.1.85) and threatened infringement 
procedures.  This move, combined with the public and political outcry over the 
designations, forced the Government to widen its definition.  Less emphasis 
was placed on the strict numerical criteria relating to the number of bathers, and 
instead factors such as the presence of life-guards and the provision of changing 
huts, car parks and toilets were used to identify bathing waters for designation.  
The Government announced in February 1987 that an additional 362 bathing 
waters had been identified for the purpose of the Directive, and additional 
waters have subsequently been designated.  Local authorities can recommend to 
the DoE that a water be added to the list, but the decision lies solely with the 
DoE.  For the 1994 season, 457 waters were designated, 418 of which were in 
England and Wales. 
 
The early designation fiasco illustrates the use of central government discretion 
to moderate the impact of the Directive, particularly in terms of limiting its 
public expenditure implications, by designating as few areas for protection as 
possible.  As we shall see below, the 1979 Shellfish Waters Directive provides 
another, though less well known, example of this strategy.  
 
The Bathing Waters Directive continues to be an environmental issue of 
considerable profile in the UK.  The quality of Britain's bathing waters and the 
degree of progress in moving towards meeting the standards laid down in the 
Directive are the subject of regular national coverage in newspapers and 
journals and on television.  There has also been an ongoing public debate 
around the appropriateness of the Directive's standards, the costs of meeting 
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them and the appropriateness of the Directive for protecting all recreational 
users of coastal waters.  The high profile of the issue in public and political life 
can be attributed, in part, to two factors.  First is the regular publication of 
bathing water monitoring results which provides 'newsworthy' material on 
implementation and an easily recognisable 'yardstick' against which the UK's 
progress towards solving its coastal pollution problems can be measured.  For 
example, as the results for each season's monitoring become available, the 
proportion of waters which comply with the Directive can be assessed against 
previous years.  The second factor concerns the activities of a range of 
environmental groups that campaign on coastal water quality issues and 
continually strive to keep the issue on the public and political agenda.   
 
The results of the water quality monitoring required by the Directive provide 
the basis for a widely used and well regarded bathing water classification 
system produced by the Marine Conservation Society (MCS).  Implementation 
of the Directive means that the MCS can now denounce 'failed' beaches in a 
way that earlier environmental campaigns, such as that mounted by the Coastal 
Anti-Pollution League, previously could not.  Until the Directive's standards 
were in place, there was no statutory yardstick against which such coastal 
pollution could be judged. 
 
The annual publication of the MCS's Good Beach Guide (MCS, 1994) usually 
attracts considerable publicity and is featured, for example, in both national and 
regional newspapers.  Importantly, in recent years the MCS has chosen to 
tighten the standard needed for a bathing water to earn a 'recommendation' in 
the Guide, and MCS's requirements now go well beyond the water quality 
standards formally required to comply with the Directive.  Therefore, although 
the DoE can argue, for example, that in 1993, 332 of the 418 waters monitored 
under the Directive complied with its standards (79.4%), the MCS's Good 
Beach Guide for that year recommends only 104 of the 743 beaches it lists for 
England and Wales as fit for bathing (14.0%). 
 
At the local level, environmental pressure groups are also able to use the 
Bathing Waters Directive to bring pressure to bear on sewage dischargers and 
other local actors to improve the quality of bathing waters.  In our local study 
area in Devon, a Green Party campaign about sewage pollution sought to raise 
public awareness about the nature of the pollution problem locally and to draw 
attention to the local activities of the Green Party and so improve its electoral 
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prospects.  The increased local press coverage of bathing water issues since 
1990 and the election of two Green Party councillors to East Devon District 
Council suggest that the campaign was successful on both counts.  However, 
without the Bathing Waters Directive such a campaign would not have been 
possible.  The Directive provided the legal norms which allowed the 
campaigners to present the pollution of bathing waters as a breach of the law. 
 
In this sense, 'Europe' becomes the moral arbiter of what constitutes polluted 
water, and environmental groups are thus able to appeal to Europe as a greater 
state authority and the guarantor of water quality.  Europe thus provides a new 
type of 'court of appeal' for environmental pressure groups to pursue their 
grievances and means that central government can be 'by-passed' where need 
be.   
 
The explicit standards provided by directives like the Bathing Waters Directive 
have also catalysed a shift in the style of political management of water quality 
issues such as coastal sewage discharges.  The previous regulatory style based 
on administrative discretion, flexibility and pragmatism fostered a style of 
political management characterised by internal administrative management 
within relatively closed policy communities, discreet lobbying and a lack of 
transparency in decision making.  However, the Bathing Waters Directive now 
furnishes a yardstick against which outsiders can judge progress and 
performance.  The regular publication of information on compliance with 
standards has meant that the issue of sewage pollution of coastal waters has 
been opened up as a focus for oppositional politics and debate.  It is only as a 
result of the Directive and the legal obligation to meet its standards that 
environmental campaigns such as that of the East Devon Green Party can be 
mounted with such effect.  If local environmental actors are able to point to 
specific breaches of European law, their campaigns are much more likely to 
feature in local (and even national) public and political debate.  The issue of 
environmental degradation is thereby turned into an indictment of government. 
It would be wrong, however, to see the pressures brought to bear by 
environmental groups through campaigns around breaches of legal standards as 
a guarantee of action to clean up beaches.  Britain has embarked upon a massive 
investment programme to improve coastal discharges of sewage, and we are in 
no doubt that the Bathing Waters Directive has been the main stimulus for such 
action.  There remain, however, examples of cases where economic (and 
political) considerations are over-riding those for improved environmental 
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quality.  In our study area, for example, it was announced in 1994 that four of 
South West Water's sewage treatment schemes (for Torbay, Dartmouth, 
Megavissey and Falmouth) were to be delayed.  The NRA claims it was not 
consulted about the decision, which appears to have been taken by DoE 
Ministers in an attempt to reduce the rate of increase in consumers' water bills 
in a politically sensitive region where the Conservative Party are vulnerable to 
defeat.  The decision has prompted outrage from local authorities in the south 
west who fear damage to the local tourist industry, but also effectively 
demonstrates the power of central government to circumvent the NRA and 
intervene in the pace of coastal clean up for political ends.  The move also 
underlines the remaining potential for central government to exercise control 
over how local compliance with the Bathing Waters Directive is achieved. 
 
With respect to the effectiveness of the Directive specifically in protecting 
public health, local pressure groups argue that even those bathing waters that 
pass the Directive are still often subject to sewage pollution.  Results from 
studies conducted by NRA South West in 1991 and 1992 are used to support 
this claim.  Beaches in the region were surveyed for objectionable 
contamination (often sewage-related debris) along their length.  On Porthtowan 
beach in Cornwall, for example, an average of 70.6 countable items of debris 
were counted per 100 metre length of beach, yet the bathing water repeatedly 
passes the Directive's Mandatory standard for coliforms (NRA South West, 
1992).  Several surfers have also been granted legal aid to pursue actions 
against water companies in the courts after becoming ill as a result, so they 
claim, of surfing in contaminated waters which comply with the terms of the 
Directive. 
 
In terms of pollution control more generally, the Bathing Waters Directive 
means that the NRA and water companies are working to those specifications 
laid down in the Directive.  The main goal is to maximise the proportion of 
bathing waters which pass the Mandatory standard.  As a result, sewage 
treatment schemes are being designed only to comply with that bare legal 
minimum standard.  Moreover, some sewage treatment works that have been 
built are allowed by the NRA to be turned off (or permitted to provide a much 
reduced level of treatment) once the official bathing season is over and 
monitoring under the Directive has been completed.  Much poorer quality 
sewage effluent is then discharged with no threat to compliance with the 
Directive, but with an increased threat to those water users such as surfers who, 
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through the wider availability of cheap wetsuits, are able to use waters well 
beyond the end of the official bathing season. 
 
Although Article 3 of the Bathing Waters Directive stipulates that Member 
States shall 'endeavour to observe' the Guideline standards (which are twenty 
times stricter than the Mandatory, legal standards), there is, according to Surfers 
Against Sewage (SAS) and other environmental groups, no concerted effort to 
meet the Guideline standards in the UK.  SAS argue that the Government's 
strategy is to "keep chasing the Mandatory standard.  That's what they're 
interested in.  They're not interested in the Guideline standard" [SAS interview].  
In our study, we could find little evidence of any 'endeavour' to meet the stricter 
quality standards. 
 
An important issue in the implementation of the Bathing Waters Directive has 
been the question of designation.  By limiting the number of areas designated 
for protection under the Directive, the Government is able to limit the amount 
of expenditure required to meet its standards.  Nowhere is this more stark than 
in the refusal to designate any inland bathing water sites, leaving the UK as the 
only Member State with no protected freshwater bathing waters.   
 
b) The Shellfish Waters Directive 
 
The Shellfish Waters Directive (79/923), adopted by the Member States in 
October 1979, aims to ensure a suitable water environment for the growth of 
shellfish.  The Directive requires Member States to designate those coastal and 
brackish waters needing protection or improvement in order to support shellfish 
life and growth, and to set values for 12 parameters listed in the Directive.  In 
July 1991 a further Directive was agreed by the Member States.  The Shellfish 
Hygiene Directive (91/492) lays down the health conditions for the production 
and the placing on the market of live bivalve molluscs (including, for example, 
oysters, mussels and clams).  This directive requires Member States to 
designate all bivalve mollusc harvesting areas and classify them according to 
the treatment required before the shellfish can be sold for human consumption.   
 
Because of the relationship between the objectives of the two directives, and the 
possible future implications for the control of coastal pollution, the 
implementation of the 1991 Shellfish Hygiene Directive at the national and 
local level has also been studied as part of the research project in each of the 
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five participating Member States.  In Britain, the most important difference 
between the two directives is that the 1979 Shellfish Waters Directive is taken 
to be concerned with the protection of water quality in shellfish waters for the 
sake of shellfish growth, while the 1991 Shellfish Hygiene Directive is 
concerned with the protection of public health through the classification and 
regulation of the quality of shellfish flesh. 
 
The Shellfish Waters Directive left it to the discretion of individual Member 
States to identify shellfish waters for designation, and the DoE advice note to 
the then Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) which implemented the Directive 
in 1980 said 
 
"In the current economic circumstances the Government accepts 
that the implementation of the Directive should not have an undue 
effect on water authorities' capital expenditure plans.  For this 
reason water authorities should aim, in the initial round to 
designate only a small number of waters which either already meet 
the appropriate standards or which are capable of doing so by 
October 1987 after improvements which are already programmed 
[sic]" (DoE, 1980, pp.1-2).  
 
As a result, only 17 shellfish waters were designated in England in 1980 along 
with 10 in Scotland.  In 1983, one additional water was designated in Wales and 
one in Northern Ireland, bringing the total number of designated waters to 29 
for the UK covering an area of only 350km2 in total.  The Directive has had 
only limited impact on administrative practices and minimal impact on shellfish 
water quality.   
 
This shortcoming arises from two problems.  First is the ambiguous nature of 
the Directive itself.  It is not entirely clear from the Directive whether its 
purpose is purely environmental or whether it also should serve a public health 
purpose.  Article 1 of the Directive suggests its purpose is to protect or improve 
shellfish life and growth "and thus contribute to the high quality of shellfish 
products directly edible by man".  To this end, several of the standards laid 
down in the Directive relate to levels of contaminants in sampled shellfish flesh 
rather than in the shellfish waters, including a Mandatory standard for 
"substances affecting the taste of the shellfish" where shellfish have to be tasted 
to assess whether their taste is impaired by contaminants.  Moreover, where 
shellfish go from designated waters direct for human consumption (with no 
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purification) then the Guideline value for faecal coliforms becomes a 
Mandatory value which must be observed.  Despite these obvious references in 
the Directive to the quality of shellfish flesh, its purpose was taken in Britain to 
be wholly environmental and with no public health implications.  In Britain, 
public health aspects of shellfish quality had long been considered to be well 
protected by the Public Health (Shellfish) Regulations 1934 concerning 
shellfish quality after the purification of shellfish.  The waters in which 
shellfish grew were not themselves a target for regulatory control to protect 
public health.   
 
The Directive is also ambiguous in its specification of the duty of Member 
States to designate waters for protection.  Although there was an initial 
impression that the Directive intended a binding obligation to designate, it came 
to be understood that the Directive allowed for discretion on the part of Member 
States to determine whether or not designations should be made.  The net result 
of this ambiguity has been that the quality of coastal and estuarine waters in 
Britain has been left almost totally unaffected by the Directive's provisions.  Of 
crucial importance has been the second of the two problems faced by the 
Directive in the UK - the British strategy for exploiting the ambiguity of the 
Directive. 
 
The then Regional Water Authorities were originally reluctant to designate 
waters because of fears about the costs of compliance.  A working group was 
convened by the Government to interpret the Directive "to see to it that it was 
implemented in the way Government Ministers had agreed" (Minutes of the 
working group, quoted in Wathern et al., 1987, p.9).  The group's deliberations 
were "strongly led" by the DoE (Wathern et al., 1987, p.9).  The strategy was to 
seek to achieve formal compliance with the Directive, because the British 
Government were keen to be seen to be complying, while ensuring that the 
Directive's impact on public expenditure was minimised (DoE, 1980, pp.1-2).  
Indeed, the DoE guidance note which implemented the Directive emphasised 
that its implementation "should have no effect, whether beneficial or 
deleterious, on commercial shellfisheries" (DoE, 1980, p.1).   
 
The first step was to overcome the Directive's ambiguity and make clear that it 
should not be seen as a public health measure (despite the references in the 
Directive to shellfish flesh).  With that interpretation, the parameter for faecal 
coliforms, for which only a Guideline value of 300 per 100ml of shellfish flesh 
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was laid down, appeared anomalous, and the DoE perversely chose to treat it as 
an indirect environmental indicator (rather than a direct public health indicator).  
As the DoE's guidance note said 
 
"in view of the absence of any direct correlation between the 
presence of faecal coliforms in the water and in the shellfish flesh, 
at any given time, and the lack of evidence that faecal coliforms 
present a threat to the well-being of shellfish, the Working Group 
were unable to recommend an upper limit for this G value.  The 
range of values within which this parameter can be said to be 
complied will therefore be left to the judgement of individual water 
authorities" (DoE, 1980, p.3). 
 
In effect, the Directive has prompted little more than administrative work in the 
UK, with the cost of any additional monitoring having to be met from existing 
resources.  Because such a small number of waters have been designated under 
the Directive, its spirit has, in effect, been circumvented in the UK, although 
this in part results from the ambiguous characteristics of the Directive itself.   
 
The circumvention of the Directive has not prompted any public or political 
controversy outside the shellfish industry.  The Lancashire and Western Sea 
Fisheries Joint Committee in 1980 expressed "dissatisfaction at the DoE's 
attitude towards implementation of the...Directive" (Lancashire and Western 
Sea Fisheries Joint Committee, 1980) and the Association of Sea Fisheries 
Committees (1982) argued that 
 
"the DoE has lost sight of the original intention of the Directive, 
which has been misrepresented so that its entire raison d'être has 
been negated .... It is a tragedy for the shellfish industry in this 
country that the opportunity presented by this Directive, for 
significant improvements to be made to the quality of coastal 
waters, has been thrown away". 
 
In short, as Wathern et al. sum up 
 
"Despite the willingness of many personnel directly concerned 
with implementation to use [the Directive] to improve pollution 
control in coastal waters, the stance taken by central government 
can result only in the Directive's incurring additional 
administrative costs to the competent authorities with no possible 
concomitant improvement in water quality" (1987, p.12). 
 15
 
It is perhaps because of the realisation that the Directive has been implemented 
in Britain in such a way as to have been of almost no practical use in achieving 
its original objectives that the Government has been pressing for the Directive 
to be repealed.   
 
Of much greater impact nationally has been the implementation of the 1991 
Shellfish Hygiene Directive (91/492).  This has prompted a comprehensive 
monitoring and classification programme involving all shellfish harvesting 
areas in the UK, and has also raised important implications for many shellfish 
producers who are now required by law to make changes to their practices 
according to the classification of their harvesting areas.  The requirements of 
the Directive are likely to mean that around 100 shellfish producers, a quarter of 
the British industry, will face additional investment. 
 
The Shellfish Hygiene Directive lays down the health conditions for the 
production and the placing on the market of live bivalve molluscs (including, 
for example, oysters, mussels and clams).  The Directive requires Member 
States to identify all bivalve mollusc harvesting areas and classify them 
according to the treatment required before the shellfish can be sold for human 
consumption.  Areas are classified as follows: 
 
Class A: where shellfish can be harvested and marketed for direct human 
consumption without any treatment or cleaning process.  Shellfish from these 
areas must conform to the 'end product standard'.  That is, they must be fresh, 
alive and free from dirt; contain less than 300 faecal coliforms or less than 230 
E.coli per 100g of mollusc flesh; contain no Salmonella in 25g of mollusc flesh; 
contain no toxic or objectionable compounds (listed in the Annex to Directive 
79/923) in such quantities that permissible daily intake may be exceeded or that 
taste may be impaired; contain a total Paralytic Shellfish Poison content of less 
than 80µg per 100g of mollusc flesh; and not contain detectable levels of 
Diarrhetic Shellfish Poison. 
 
Class B: where shellfish can only be placed on the market after re-laying in 
clean sea water or treatment in an approved purification centre, usually for 48 
hours until they reach end product standard (as defined above).  Areas are 
classified as Class B if shellfish contain not more than 6,000 faecal coliforms 
per 100g of flesh; or 4,600 E.Coli per 100g of flesh in 90% of samples taken. 
 
Class C: where shellfish can only be placed on the market after being relaid 
in cleaner waters (classified as Classes A and B) for at least two months or after 
 16
intensive purification (through approved methods of heat treatment).  Shellfish 
sampled from these areas must not exceed 60,000 faecal coliforms per 100g of 
flesh. 
 
Class D (or 'Prohibited'):  If the shellfish sampled from a harvesting area 
contain more than 60,000 faecal coliforms per 100g of flesh, then the marketing 
of shellfish for human consumption is prohibited.  All waters that have not been 
subject to a full monitoring programme are classified as 'Prohibited' in the UK, 
which means that the vast bulk of the British coastline fall into this category. 
 
The early stages of implementing the Shellfish Hygiene Directive, and 
particularly the classification of shellfish harvesting areas, has helped bring into 
focus the relationship between the management of coastal water quality and the 
conditions for healthy shellfish production.   
 
The Directive represents a fundamental shift in the philosophy of safeguarding 
public health in relation to shellfish consumption in the UK.  Previously, 
regulation was focused on the point of retail, but now quality standards are 
being applied further up the production chain at the point of harvest.  As a 
result, the impact of the Shellfish Hygiene Directive upon shellfish production 
in the UK has been profound, and it may be argued that the scale of its impact 
has been a result of the circumvention of the earlier Shellfish Waters Directive.  
More concerted application of the Shellfish Waters Directive should have meant 
cleaner shellfish waters with the shellfish harvested from them containing lower 
levels of contamination. 
 
A good example of the potentially dramatic impact that implementation of the 
1991 Shellfish Hygiene Directive can have on shellfish producers can be found 
in the case of the Taw Mussel Fishery in Devon.  The Taw Mussel Fishery is 
owned by Mr Brian Hill, whose family have been involved in the harvesting of 
mussels in the Taw-Torridge estuary for several generations.  Mussels have 
been collected in the area for centuries, although declining mussels stocks in the 
early 1960s meant that the emphasis changed from simply gathering mussels to 
the controlled husbandry of specific mussel beds.  The Fishery's purification 
tank has a capacity to purify 2 tonnes of mussels at a time, and its operations are 
overseen by the North Devon District Council's Environmental Health 
Department (EHD) for the protection of public health.  Until January 1993 the 
essential requirement was that the E.coli count in the mussels after purification 
did not exceed 230 E.coli per 100 grams of mussel flesh, a standard that raised 
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no problems for the business.  Indeed, in the forty years that Mr Hill has been 
harvesting mussels in the area, he claims not to have received any reported 
incidents of illness connected with his mussels.     
 
Until 1992 it was samples of depurated mussels that were usually taken (i.e. 
after the mussels had been through the purification tanks).  Counts of between 0 
and 250 E.coli per 100g were recorded, although most of the readings were in 
the 0 to 50 range.  A small number of samples were also taken from the 
harvesting areas.  From January 1992 a more formal sampling procedure was 
adopted.  Each of the 12 mussel beds in the estuary were identified, and samples 
have since been taken from the harvesting areas at two-weekly intervals for 
testing. 
 
Using the data collected by the EHD, MAFF announced in November 1992 its 
provisional classification of harvesting areas.  Of the 12 beds in the Taw, 6 were 
classified as Class C and 6 were ‘prohibited’.  Since 1992, however, the results 
for all the beds have continued to deteriorate, such that all 12 sometimes yield 
sampling results warranting a 'prohibited' classification. 
 
The main reason for the high coliform counts in the shellfish is the discharge of 
sewage into the estuary.  The combined population of nearby Barnstaple and 
Braunton has risen by almost 20% since 1971 to 28,325 in 1991 according to 
census figures, and rises by a further 28% in the summer months to over 
36,000.   A series of studies conducted in the late 1980s by consultants on 
behalf of the then South West Water Authority confirmed that around 95% of 
the coliform bacteria in the estuary originated from the outfalls from three 
sewage treatment works which discharge into the estuarine waters.  In total, 
around 120,000 million coliforms enter the estuary per second (South West 
Water Authority, 1989).  The three sewage treatment works only provide 
primary treatment of sewage, thus resulting in the gross bacteriological 
contamination of the estuarine waters.  Of even greater concern has been the 
presence of enteroviruses.  Two studies reported to the newly privatised South 
West Water (SWW) in 1989 and 1990 detected enteroviruses in the estuary 
(SWW, 1989; 1990). 
 
In combination, the continued discharge of sewage effluent into the Taw estuary 
and the implementation of the 1991 Shellfish Hygiene Directive have placed the 
Taw Mussel Fishery in an impossible position.  Those mussels harvested from 
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the areas classified as Class C would have to be relaid in cleaner waters, the 
nearest of which are in south Devon.  To re-lay would cost over £900 per tonne 
(not accounting for any losses of shellfish in the process) in terms of labour and 
transport.  The market value of mussels is only around £600 per tonne, and so 
re-laying is not economically viable, even if suitable re-laying areas with spare 
capacity and the necessary legal rights could be found.  As a result, Mr Hill has 
been forced by the local EHD to close down his business and is pursuing a legal 
action against the polluter, SWW. 
 
Between the implementation of the two shellfish directives in the early 1980s 
and the early 1990s, it became increasingly clear in the UK that there were 
important areas of overlap between the interests of shellfish producers and those 
of environmental groups pressing for improved coastal pollution control.  It was 
a campaign during the mid-1980s to ban the use of Tributyl tin (TBT), a 
chemical used in anti-fouling paints on yachts and found to stunt the growth of 
shellfish, which brought the two groups together. 
 
Prior to the TBT campaign, environmental groups had been viewed with 
suspicion by shellfish interests.  Since the TBT campaign, however, a different 
relationship exists.  There is now closer liaison and exchange of ideas and 
information.  The experience of the campaign has also laid the ground for 
further co-operation with the Marine Conservation Society’s sewage campaign.  
These links have been useful to shellfish interests as it has been increasingly 
realised that the implementation of the 1991 Shellfish Hygiene Directive will 
mean that shellfish producers are again set to suffer as a result of the pollution 
of coastal waters. 
 
To conclude, our study suggests that the 1979 Shellfish Waters Directive has 
had next to no impact nationally nor in the south west region because of the 
Government's strategy for exploiting the Directive's ambiguity and seeking to 
minimise public expenditure on improving pollution control rather than 
maximising the protection provided under the provisions of the Directive. 
 
In contrast, the 1991 Shellfish Hygiene Directive has had much greater impact 
in terms of the increased regulatory workload and the investments in 
purification required of many shellfish producers.  Despite being essentially a 
public health directive, it has had the effect of bringing to wider attention the 
problems faced by shellfish producers as a result of the pollution of coastal 
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waters.  Under the previous regulatory regime, controls were based on the 
monitoring of shellfish after purification, and so sewage contamination posed 
fewer problems for shellfish producers.  With the 1991 Directive, the 
classification of harvesting areas on the basis of the quality of shellfish flesh 
prior to purification means that those producers in more polluted waters are 
facing the biggest problems in complying with the new regulations. 
 
The alliance of interests, first recognised during the TBT saga of the mid-1980s,  
has resulted in a loose network of groups and individuals, including some 
shellfish producers and their representatives, based mainly, but not solely in the 
south west, who are campaigning to address the problem of sewage discharges 
to marine waters.  Moreover, the Shellfish Hygiene Directive, although posing 
acute problems for some producers, has also helped in the campaign against 
sewage pollution of coastal waters by providing the scope for a legal challenge, 
which parallels the legal approach taken by surfers and private beach owners in 
the region. 
 
c) The Drinking Water Directive 
 
The Drinking Water Directive (80/778), agreed by the Member States in July 
1980, is intended to standardise drinking water quality norms across the 
Member States of the European Union.  It sets down standards for the quality of 
water intended for human consumption and for use in food and drink in order to 
protect human health.  The Directive originally required Member States to 
ensure that the quality of water intended for human consumption comply with 
the standards laid down in the Directive within five years of its notification 
(mid-1985).  Sixty-two different standards (or 'parameters') for water quality are 
laid down along with guidelines for water quality monitoring.  Member States 
are permitted to apply more stringent provisions than those in the Directive if 
they so wish. 
The approach to drinking water quality assessment and control contained within 
the Drinking Water Directive clearly differs fundamentally from long-standing 
British practice. We can identify five principal areas of change. 
 
First, the shift from relative and negotiated to absolute and regulatory 
definitions of water quality, based upon maximum permitted concentrations of 
known pollutants, represents a major change from established British practice.  
As such, it has had significant implications both for the organisations and 
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institutions charged with maintaining drinking water quality and for some of 
those activities that can threaten that quality.  Second, the Directive has 
necessitated the introduction and standardisation of sampling, analysis and 
evaluation techniques.  Not only do these mandatory techniques differ from 
preceding British practice, but they have required new monitoring roles.  Third, 
the need for a competent authority in water quality control has been a major 
factor in the reorganisation of British environmental agencies and institutions.  
In addition, the transfer of drinking water supply management, treatment and 
delivery functions in England and Wales from public sector agencies to private 
companies under the 1989 Water Act has required the formal separation of 
these functions from drinking water quality regulation.  This is now the 
responsibility of the Drinking Water Inspectorate.  Fourth, the Directive has 
brought new environmental issues onto the national political agenda, 
particularly in the case of pesticide and nitrate concentrations in drinking water.  
This, in itself, has had a number of significant effects.  It has brought new 
interests and actors into the water quality debate; it has challenged established 
practices, particularly in the field of agriculture and agricultural pollution 
control; and it has focused public and media attention by establishing 
quantifiable 'definitions' of polluted, and thus also 'clean', water.  By coinciding 
with water privatisation, the Directive has also opened up debates about the 
notion of water cleanliness in public health, the assessment and implications of 
the costs of supplying clean water, and the profitability to the private sector of 
providing water services.  Finally, the Directive has highlighted the problems of 
legal transposition of European legislation faced by British governments. 
  
In the UK, the Drinking Water Directive, along with that for bathing waters, has 
been one of the most widely debated pieces of European environmental 
legislation, with its water quality and monitoring requirements being 
instrumental in transforming public and political concern about drinking water 
quality.  Prior to its adoption, there was very little publicly available data 
concerning the spread and scale of drinking water contamination (Hill et al., 
1989).  The establishment of mandatory water quality standards and the 
publication of monitoring results that the Directive requires have meant that a 
wide range of both public and private interests, including environmental groups, 
professional bodies and others, now have sufficient information to mount 
increasingly detailed challenges to suppliers of contaminated drinking water, to 
government water and environmental policy makers, to the cost structure of 
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drinking water provision and, for certain interests, to the scientific basis of the 
standards contained within the Directive.   
 
Publication of the annual reports by the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI)  
reveals a high level of compliance with the Directive's standards.  Nevertheless, 
the publication of these and other water quality assessments has provoked a 
vigorous national debate with environmental groups and elements of the 
national press maintaining that a significant proportion of the British population 
is currently receiving drinking water that does not meet the Directive's 
standards.  In July 1993, for example, Friends of the Earth  claimed that as 
many as 14.5 million consumers in England and Wales were receiving sub-
standard drinking water (The Guardian, 13th July 1993).  The substantial 
difference between the 1.2% level of non-compliance asserted by the DWI and 
the various figures quoted by national newspapers points to different types of 
interpretation of what are predominantly official figures. (Usually the figures 
for populations possibly affected appear more dramatic than those relating to 
the percentage of samples failing standards).   
 
While some concentrations of contaminants can be due to the condition of water 
supply pipes both to and within individual households, the presence of 
pesticides and nitrates in drinking water implies a direct relationship between 
run-off or leaching into water source areas and drinking water supplies 
delivered to consumers.  It is to these two particular parameters that we now 
turn for they, more than any other, have focused public and political concern 
and debate over the practical implementation of the Drinking Water Directive in 
Britain. 
 
The main approach to the issue of excessive nitrate concentrations has involved 
those responsible for supplying drinking water rather than those held 
responsible for the contamination of drinking water sources.  One key political 
question has been how to regulate the contamination from agriculture - a sector 
that has hitherto operated relatively free from environmental regulation.  A 
second question has been how to pay for cleaning up contaminated water 
destined for human consumption once it has been abstracted.  In Britain the 
nitrate issue has been closely linked to that of water privatisation: recognition of 
the cost and legal implications of meeting the Directive's 50mg/litre standard 
for nitrates in water coincided with Government plans in the mid-1980s to 
privatise the water industry.  The terms of privatisation allowed the water 
 22
companies to pass on the costs of meeting environmental standards to the 
customer.  Because the new, private water companies have no statutory 
responsibility to represent the interests of water consumers, they have little 
incentive to press for other interests to shoulder the burden of cleaning up, or to 
press for the pursuit of preventative approaches that tackle pollution at its 
source.  
 
In 1986, it was estimated that in order to keep drinking water supplies below the 
50 mg/litre nitrate limit, expenditure of some £50 million would be needed 
immediately.  Over 20 years, £200 million would be needed to supply potable 
water to the 4 to 5 million people affected by sub-standard supplies (Nitrate Co-
ordination Group, 1986, p.39).  A more recent assessment of the costs of full 
compliance (POST, 1993) put expenditure to date by the privatised water 
companies on reducing nitrate levels at £115 million and further budget 
commitments by the English and Welsh water companies at £164 million for 
the period up to 1995. 
 
The effect of the Drinking Water Directive in forcing the collection of data and 
so enabling its use by environmental groups is best exemplified in the case of 
pesticide contamination, which has subsequently emerged as an issue of public 
and political concern. 
 
The problem of pollution of surface and groundwaters by agricultural pesticides 
did not materialise until the late 1980s.  The Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution, in its 1979 study of agriculture and pollution, devoted 
over a quarter of its report to looking at pesticides but water pollution was not 
specifically dealt with.  During the 1970s, water pollution from farming 
practices had become something of a 'non-problem'. The water authorities 
acquiesced in the priority given by government to the expansion of food 
production over the curbing of farm pollution, and this led to a lack of effort in 
the monitoring of agricultural pollution.  This lack of information about the 
extent of farm pollution completed a circle that, in effect, closed off the issue.  
The dearth of information meant, in turn, a lack of public awareness leading to 
little pressure on water authorities or policy makers to address the issue, or on 
politicians to acknowledge its existence. 
 
The implementation of the Drinking Water Directive challenged this 
complacency.  The Directive set a very low maximum admissible concentration 
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(MAC) level of 0.1µg/litre for any individual pesticide and 0.5µg/litre for total 
pesticides, the first legally-enforceable, numerical standards for pesticides in 
water in Britain.  Crucially, the MACs have provided an authoritative norm. 
They have come to represent the very definition of pesticide pollution as a 
public problem and a yardstick against which the extent of pesticide pollution in 
water can be measured.   
 
Water Authority records, collected to satisfy the Directive's monitoring 
requirements, were surveyed by Friends of the Earth and revealed that between 
July 1985 and June 1987, the MAC for any single pesticide had been exceeded 
in 298 water supplies and the MAC for total pesticides had been exceeded 70 
times (FoE, 1988).  The report, which subsequently informed a major feature in 
the Observer Magazine in August 1989 (Observer, 1989), brought the now 
measurable problem of pesticide pollution to wider public attention. 
 
Currently, when water supplies exceed the MAC, water companies have to 
install equipment to remove pesticides from supplies.  The costs of this strategy 
run to hundreds of millions of pounds.  In order to meet the MACs, 
considerable additional treatment is being required at waterworks and at high 
cost (Ward et al., 1993).  Other regulatory responses to the problem are being 
considered, however.  For example, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food (MAFF) is conducting a large review of older pesticides using stricter 
standards than have been used in the past.  Moreover, since April 1992 the use 
of two polluting herbicides, Atrazine and Simazine, on non-cropped land has 
been banned by MAFF.  The ban is viewed as a precedent because it is the first 
major regulatory decision to be influenced directly by the need to comply with 
the EU MACs rather than by conventional toxicological considerations.  
 
Regulatory pressure on pesticides is likely to continue to increase, particularly 
in the light of agreements made by the Government at the Third International 
Conference on the Protection of the North Sea in 1990 (Beaumont, 1993), the 
increasing interest in sustainable development (UK Government, 1994) and 
European-wide pressures to implement pesticide reduction programmes.  It is 
possible that some of the more persistent and problematic pesticides will be 
withdrawn from use.  Furthermore, the concept of water protection zones has, 
since the mid-1980s, been gaining acceptance among some policy makers and 
regulatory agencies (NRA, 1992; RCEP, 1992) who are beginning to consider 
tougher controls on the use of polluting pesticides in specific catchments 
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(ENDS, 1990; Barnden et al., 1990; Farmers Weekly, 1990).  This could follow 
the model of MAFF's Nitrate Sensitive Areas established in 1989, whereby 
particularly vulnerable catchments or aquifers are targeted for additional 
regulatory controls on farming practices in order to protect water quality.  This 
strategy has the advantage of not penalising all farmers in order to solve the 
environmental problems of specific localities.  Critically, however, and of 
particular relevance to this study, these regulatory debates would never have 
taken place had it not been for the operation of the Drinking Water Directive.        
 
In our study area in the south west, drinking water quality issues have not 
proved to be particularly controversial at the local level, particularly in 
comparison with debates about the implementation of the Drinking Water 
Directive nationally, and in comparison with other water pollution issues 
locally, such as the pollution of bathing waters and water pollution from farm 
effluents.  This is primarily because of the relatively high quality of the 
drinking water supplied by South West Water.  Water treatment is sufficient to 
meet the statutory standards almost all the time, and the most common breaches 
result from the influence of substances in the distribution system rather than 
from pollution of raw waters by industrial or agricultural processes.  The high 
rates of compliance with the statutory standards mean that there is little public 
concern about the state of drinking water locally. 
 
This is not the case with the implementation of the Directive across the UK as a 
whole, however.  The European regulatory approach of standard setting has, 
since the late 1980s, had a much greater influence on regulatory policy and 
practice relating to drinking water quality, has opened up the issue to greater 
scrutiny by environmental pressure groups and to the adversarial style of 
political debate they bring, and has meant that the traditional British approach 
to environmental management, characterised by flexibility, pragmatism and 
closed policy communities, has been on the wane. 
 
Implementation of the Directive, along with the establishment of the Drinking 
Water Inspectorate, has also meant that detailed and comprehensive data on the 
quality of Britain's drinking water is widely available.  This has been contrasted 
with the arrangements in other European Member States where compiling data 
on drinking water quality is sometimes much more difficult (see, for example, 
Clover and Spencer, 1993).  Here, the annual reports produced by the Drinking 
Water Inspectorate have proved invaluable resources, not only to environmental 
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pressure groups with an interest in water quality issues, but also to the water 
industry, public policy makers and the research community.  
 
iii) Conclusions 
 
Our study underlines, at the very least, that the implementation of EU 
environmental policy within a Member State is as much a political process as 
the formulation of policy in the first place.  Although officials in agencies like 
the NRA,  who are often steeped in an ethos of rational science, present 
implementation as a matter of carrying out policy decisions in a straightforward, 
rational and scientifically informed manner, this is not the case.  Efforts to make 
a particular environmental directive fit the national context do not simply 
disappear once the directive is agreed at the European level (Haigh, 1986, p.91).  
We would argue, on the basis of our research, that the interpretation of 
directives, in the drawing up of national guidelines or policy measures for 
implementation, may significantly reorient their objectives and diminish or 
widen their scope.  In the cases we have examined, the scope was often 
diminished and, in consequence, levels of protection offered by directives have 
been watered down.  This crucial stage in proceedings is carefully orchestrated 
by central government.  Even though the NRA may be the competent authority 
in implementing most water quality directives, the 'rules of the game' are set by 
the DoE.  In addition, it continues to be for the DoE to decide in the first 
instance, for example, how bathing or shellfish waters are to be designated 
under EU directives, and whether new waters can be subsequently designated.   
 
Interestingly, the Drinking Water Directive provides a different type of story.  
The quality of drinking water supplies are monitored at the point of supply (the 
customers' taps) and the Directive applies to all supplies and not just those in 
'designated areas'.  As a result, it has been much more difficult for central 
government to limit the Directive's impact and we can now see the Directive's 
standards laid down in British legislation.  Unfortunately, as the examples of 
pesticide and nitrate contamination illustrate, the British strategy for complying 
with many of the Directive's standards through water treatment has meant that 
pollution of the water environment more generally may not be reduced.  
Although preventative action is widely accepted as a sound principle of 
pollution control, compliance with the Drinking Water Directive has been 
ensured by cleaning up pollution after it has occurred (through additional 
treatment at water works) rather than preventative action to address some of its 
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underlying causes (such as, for example, through the control of pesticide and 
fertiliser use). 
 
On the question of appropriate institutional structures for administering 
environmental protection, the findings from our research have important 
implications for the formation and development of the Environment Agency in 
Britain.  Proposals for the new agency are currently being debated by 
Parliament, and concerns have been expressed, for example, by Lord 
Crickhowell, the Chairman of the NRA about the wide-ranging powers 
proposed for central government to intervene in the new Agency's work.  The 
NRA's constrained relationship with Whitehall has, we would suggest, resulted 
in serious restrictions in the level of potential protection offered by some 
European environmental directives.  If the new Environment Agency is to 
require even greater 'approval by Ministers' with respect to its functions than 
has been the case with the NRA,  we can expect to see a continuing watering 
down of the protection offered by EU environmental directives when they come 
to be interpreted at the national level. 
 
Another important theme illuminated by our study concerns the way that 
European water directives have transformed the nature of environmental 
politics in Britain.  The setting of legally-enforceable water quality standards, 
and the public availability of information on compliance with such standards, 
have provided the tools for environmental pressure groups to pursue a more 
vigorous style of oppositional politics in a way that was previously not possible.  
Indeed, we might say that the issues of sewage pollution of bathing waters and 
pesticide contamination of drinking water would not have received such 
widespread public and political attention had it not been for European 
directives.  Moreover, it is European directives that now help characterise the 
very nature of these problems and define what counts as a 'polluted beach' or a 
'contaminated water supply'. 
 
Finally, our study raises important questions concerning the pursuit of the 
principle of subsidiarity in relation to environmental policy and the quest for a 
so-called 'level playing field' in standards of environmental protection.  We 
might indeed argue that subsidiarity is already being applied by means of 
differential interpretation and implementation of environmental directives 
across Member States.  As our study demonstrates, there is considerable scope 
for national discretion in how directives are implemented and how compliance 
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with them is achieved.  However, where European water quality directives have 
stimulated real efforts to improve pollution control in the UK, this has been not 
so much the result of the effectiveness of European directives per se, but rather 
because the British public is demanding that international commitments made 
by the Government are fully implemented and observed. 
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